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EMPLOYMENT LAW CLAIMS: TRIGGERING 

COVERAGE UNDER "CLAIMS MADE" 

POLICIES 

WAYNE E. BORGEEST 
ANTHONY J. FOWLER 
MICHAEL M. SANTOCKI* 
INTRODUCTION 
Employment law liability claims can give rise to some unusual 
coverage issues and present some practical claims handling 
problems for both risk managers and insurers. This ArtiCle will dis­
cuss the particular problems that arise when the relevant liability 
policy is a "claims made" or "claims made and reported" policy. 
This often is the case when an employer seeks coverage under a 
Director's and Officer's ("D&O") policy or an Errors and Omis­
sions ("E&O") policy. These issues promise to grow in significance 
due to the fact that the Employment Practices Liability Policies now 
emerging in the insurance market generally are nearly always writ­
ten only on a "claims made" basis as well. 
First and foremost, this Article analyzes what constitutes a 
claim. In particular, this Article will discuss whether the filing of a 
"charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") or a state human rights agency amounts to a "claim" for 
insurance coverage purposes. Additionally, this Article describes 
the reporting and notice requirements in a "claims made" policy 
governing the information that must be provided to the insurer sub­
sequent to the assertion of a claim. This Article discusses this issue 
especially with respect to an employer's duties when it receives or 
makes an offer to pay a nominal severance or settlement payment 
to a terminated employee. Finally, the strategic importance of pro­
* Wayne E. Borgeest is a partner in the New York City law finn of Wilson, Elser, 
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker. Mr. Borgeest's practice is oriented towards director 
and officer liability and D&O insurance, and he is the finn's National Coordinator for 
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Geneseo and the Pace University School of Law. Anthony J. Fowler, and Michael M. 
Santocki are associates at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker. 
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viding a "laundry list" of information relative to possible claims will 
be reviewed. 
I. EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: WHAT Is A "CLAIM"? 
An initial and fundamental question in the arena of employ­
ment law liability is what constitutes a "claim" for insurance cover­
age purposes. Although litigated extensively in other contexts, the 
issue is probably more difficult and problematic in the employment 
law arena, given the variety of administrative and litigation venues. 
There is, of course, no question that a legal action filed in court and 
served on the employer constitutes a "claim" under virtually any 
"claims made" liability policy. Coverage issues often arise, how­
ever, relating to all the facts and circumstances that lead up to the 
filing of a suit. For example, an employee unhappy with his annual 
performance review might orally threaten to quit and file suit but 
take no further action immediately. The employee may pursue the 
matter by filing a "charge" or a grievanc~ with the EEOC, alleging 
unlawful discriminatory conduct by the employer. The EEOC may 
then, on its own initiative, refer the charge to a state agency or 
human rights commission for review. Alternatively, the employee 
may go directly to the state agency and file a "charge" that, in turn, 
may be referred to the EEOC for handling. Significant uncertainty 
exists as to which, if any, of these circumstances would be a claim 
within the meaning of the "claims made" policy. 
A. Policy Definition of "Claim" 
The first step in answering the question of what constitutes a 
claim is to review the particular insurance policy to determine 
whether it defines the word "claim." As a result of past uncer­
tainty, many "claims made" policies now contain a definition for 
the word "claim," but the definitions vary and mayor may not in­
clude "administrative proceedings." A typical endorsement to a 
widely used" claims made" policy from a Director and Officer in­
surer contains the following definition: "The term 'Claim' shall 
mean any judicial or administrative proceeding or specific written 
demand initiated against a Director or Officer by a third party in 
which such Director or Officer may be subjected to a binding adju­
dication of liability for damages or other relief."l This definition 
makes clear that a "claim" includes an administrative proceeding 
1. See, e.g., Directors' and Officers' Liability Policy issued by Reliance Insurance 
Company (on file with authors) (emphasis added). 
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. before a state or federal agency, depending on the authority exer­
cised by the agency. Therefore, in order to interpret this definition, 
it is necessary to understand the substantive powers exercised by 
the administrative agencies involved in the case. 
State human rights agencies that are empowered to award 
damages and demand services from individuals against whom 
charges have been filed are said to have "coercive authority." 
Agencies that cannot award damages and demand services are said 
to have only "powers of conciliation." When the state agency has 
powers of conciliation only and no powers of coercion, the agency 
generaJ1y does have the power to refer the charge to a state court 
for adjudication. Thus, it might appear at first glance that a charge 
filed with such an agency may ultimately lead to an adjudication 
that a named director or officer is liable for damages or other relief. 
However, in this situation, it is only the court that can award dam­
ages and compel relief. Therefore, a filing with such an agency does 
not meet the full definition of a "claim." Of course, once the 
charge is referred to the court and the employer is served with no­
tice of such referral, the charge or potential claim becomes a 
"claim" under the policy definition, thereby triggering coverage. 
The federal EEOC, which is an agency with powers of concilia­
tion only, is empowered to commence suit on its own initiative or 
on behalf of an aggrieved party who has followed appropriate ad­
ministrative procedures. However, this power alone also fails to 
give rise to true coercive authority. The filing transfers the power 
to the court, much as the state agency's referral would do, and the 
court, not the agency, has coercive authority in these instances. 
Due to the agency's lack of power, it can only call upon the court to 
pick up where the agency leaves off. Once the EEOC has made the 
decision to file suit, it becomes a litigant, and it is the filing of the 
suit and service of the complaint which constitutes the actual claim. 
For this reason, a mere filing with the EEOC may not constitute a 
claim while a suit filed by the EEOC on behalf of the aggrieved 
party clearly would constitute the making of a "claim" for insurance 
coverage purposes. 
In summary, when the policy defines the term "claim" to in­
clude such things as administrative proceedings that "may" result in 
an adjudication of liability, the insured will likely be able to estab­
lish that it is entitled to coverage if the agency exercises coercive 
authority. Such coverage normally would include payment or reim­
bursement of counsel's fees for responding to the claim. On the 
other hand, with regard to an administrative proceeding before an 
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agency without coercive authority, the insurer will likely be able to 
establish that no "claim" exists yet. This is true because the re­
sponding party can only be subjected to a binding adjudication of 
liability in a court, not through an administrative proceeding before 
an agency. 
However, it is important to remember that when policy lan­
guage is subject to interpretation in coverage disputes, courts gener­
ally adopt an interpretation that favors the interests of the insured 
if there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Should a court determine 
that the term "claim" is ambiguous, and that the policy engenders a 
reasonable expectation that a non-coercive administrative proceed­
ing constitutes a claim, the court might decide to honor this expec­
tation by finding that coverage is afforded under the policy. Given 
the interpretation preference for protecting the reasonable expecta­
tions of insureds, many insurers decide to provide no definition in 
the policy.2 The insured will often insist that a definition of claim is 
provided by endorsement, thereby exposing the insurer to the risk 
that the definition will be interpreted in an unintended manner. 
B. Analysis when the Policy is Silent 
1. Charges Filed with the EEOC 
If the policy in question does not contain a definition of the 
word "claim," courts generally have held that the filing of a charge 
with the EEOC does nothing more than initiate an investigative 
proceeding since the EEOC lacks coercive authority. In Bensalem 
. Township v. Western World Insurance Co. ,3 the underlying dispute 
involved an age discrimination action brought against a township by 
the widow of a township police officer. Prior to filing her lawsuit, 
the widow had filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC sub­
sequently corresponded with the township to advise it of the dis­
crimination charge. " 
The court determined that the EEOC correspondence was not 
a "claim" within the meaning of the policy. The court reasoned: 
2. In one recent case, however, it was held that the mere absence of a definition 
for the term "claim" in the policy rendered the determination of what was or was not a 
claim inherently ambiguous. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walke, No. 92-0430, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8919 (C.D. La., Feb. 25, 1994). If this becomes a trend, insurers will do 
well to provide more definitions of terms in the policy. This, of course, will lead to 
longer and more complex policies, and more words lend greater potential for 
ambiguity. 
3. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (B.D. Pa. 1985). 
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[T]he EEOC letter of September 1981 was at most a notice that 
Mrs. Johnson intended to hold plaintiff responsible for a wrong­
ful act. Neither the letter nor the attached charge of discrimina­
tion requested money or other relief; neither document stated 
that a lawsuit was to follow. The closest the letter comes to any 
such formal demand is the statement that, upon receiving a 
charge of discrimination, the EEOC is required to notify the pro­
spective defendant and try to eliminate any alleged unlawful 
practice by informal conciliation, conference and persuasion .... 
This statement does indeed suggest that a formal lawsuit may fol­
low (hence the term "prospective defendant"), but it also sug­
gests that any such formal proceeding will be preceded by EEOC 
efforts to resolve the matter informally. The letter thus informed 
plaintiff that a demand for relief, based on a legal right, might 
well follow. Neither the letter nor the charge, however, pur­
. ported to be such a demand.4 
A number of other cases have established that it is not so much 
the content of EEOC correspondence that is determinative as it is 
the nature of the EEOC as a conciliating agency. In Campbell Soup 
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.,5 twenty-two insurance compa­
nies obtained summary judgment on the issue of whether they were 
required to defend and indemnify Campbell Soup Company against 
a discrimination claim pending before the EEOC. The Campbell 
Soup case arose as a consequence of a charge filed by the EEOC 
commissioner on September 29, 1980. On May 6,1986, the EEOC 
found reasonable cause to believe that Campbell had engaged in 
substantial discriminatory hiring and employment practices. The 
reasonable cause determination issued by the EEOC alleged that 
Campbell had discriminated against blacks and women because of 
their race and/or sex with respect to recruitment, hiring, assign­
ment, promotion, training, policies and practices, and other terms 
and conditions of employment. Campbell contended that the rea­
sonable cause determination was the functional equivalent of a suit 
because it initiated an administrative procedure that was coercive in 
nature. The insurers countered that the EEOC reasonable cause 
determination merely sought to place the plaintiff in a conciliation 
mode pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 2000(e)-5(b). 
The narrow issue resolved by the court was whether a reason­
able cause determination by the EEOC compels insurers, pursuant 
to the terms of their liability policies, to defend insureds in EEOC 
4. Id. at 1348 (citation omitted). 
5. 239 N.J. Super. 403, 571 A.2d 969 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
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proceedings, where such proceedings are conducted in response to 
charges of discriminatory hiring and employment practices. In find­
ing for the insurers, the court held that the EEOC's reasonable 
cause determination was not "the functional equivalent of a suit" so 
as to require the insurers to defend the insureds. The court agreed 
with the decision of the trial court that the duty to defend is trig­
gered when the insured is involved in an adversarial proceeding, a 
consequence of which is the factual determination that legal liabil­
ity mayor may not be imposed upon the insured. The court noted 
that even though an EEOC probable cause determination was ad­
missible in a subsequent federal action instituted by the EEOC or 
the aggrieved party, this admissibility does not transform the 
EEOC conciliation process into a coercive, adversarial proceeding 
tantamount to a suit, for which a duty to defend is owed. The court 
similarly found that there was no obligation of indemnification 
under any of the policies.6 
2. Charges Filed with State Agencies 
The question of whether an administrative action constitutes a 
claim in the absence of a policy definition is much more complex 
with respect to filings with state agencies. Almost every state, with 
the notable exceptions of Mississippi and Alabama, has its own 
state agency or human rights commission. The powers of these 
agencies vary in a number of respects. In many states, the human 
rights agency has essentially the same conciliatory powers and au­
thorities as the EEOC. Hence, for the reasons discussed in the pre­
ceding section, the filing of a "charge" with a human rights agency 
in those jurisdictions likely will not constitute a "claim." Other 
state agencies, however, are empowered to do much more than sim­
ply investigate charges of discrimination. Many state agencies are 
empowered to award damages, including back pay, front pay, puni­
tive, and compensatory damages. Hence, in these jurisdictions, the 
filing of a "charge" with a state agency likely would constitute the 
making of a "claim" within the meaning of a "claims made" policy. 
Texas is an example of a state whose anti-discrimination laws 
are substantially identical to the federal statutes and the EEOC reg­
ulations. For example, Texas makes it an unlawful employment 
6. See also Abifadel v. Cigna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(cease and desist order, examination report, and various other regulatory agency com­
munications, taken together or separately, do not constitute claims absent specific de­
mands for services or payments). 
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practice for an employer to: (1) fail or refuse to hire an individual, 
or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to com­
pensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment be­
cause of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age; 
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for 
employment in a way that would deprive or tend to deprive the 
individual of employment opportunities,? The state agency charged 
with enforcement of Texas' anti-discrimination laws is empowered 
to investigate complaints and determine whether there is a "reason­
able cause to believe" that an employer who is alleged to have vio­
lated the anti-discrimination statute did in fact engage in unlawful 
employment practices as alleged by the aggrieved party.8 
Texas Labor Code sections 21.206 and 21.207 provide that 
where there is reasonable cause to believe an employer has engaged 
in an unlawful employment practice, a written determination to that 
effect shall be issued and provided to the aggrieved party, the em­
ployer, and other agencies as required by Texas law. This section 
further provides that the agency must endeavor to eliminate alleged 
unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion. Barring the successful conciliation of 
the claim, the commission and/or the aggrieved party's only re­
course is to the courts. The commission cannot compel services or 
award damages of its own accord.9 Because any filing of a discrimi­
nation claim with the Texas Commission on Human Rights would 
not, therefore, be a demand for money or services, it would not 
constitute a claim any more than the same filing with the EEOC. 
To the extent the Texas Commission retains the power to initiate 
suit on behalf of an insured or to enforce its holdings, it is the court, 
not the commission, whose powers give rise to a claim at that time. 
The laws of Texas contrast with those of other states such as 
New York. In New York, if the New York State Division on 
Human Rights finds that an employer has committed any unlawful 
discriminatory practice, it may require that the offending employer: 
cease and desist from such practice;lO take affirmative action;H or 
7. TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West 1995). 
8. §§ 21.002, 21.201-04. 
9. §§ 21.210, 21.208,21.251-56. 
10. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.4(c)(i) (McKinney 1995). 
11. This power includes, but is not limited to hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading 
of employees, with or without back pay, restoration to membership in any respondent 
labor organization, admission to or participation in a guidance program, apprenticeship 
training program, on the job training program, or other occupational training or retain­
ing program. § 297.4(c)(ii). 
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pay compensatory damages;12 and may report on the adequacy and 
manner of the offending employer's compliance with any mandates 
issued by the Division.13 The New York State Division on Human 
Rights also has extensive discretion in fashioning other remedies, as 
long as these remedies bear a reasonable relation to the particular 
discriminatory practice that has been found to exist, and to the pub­
lic policies giving rise to the particular anti-discrimination statute 
that has been violated.14 Therefore, because the New York State 
Division on Human Rights can award damages and compel services 
from employers who violate New York Anti-Discrimination provi­
sions, any filing with that agency by an allegedly aggrieved party 
likely would constitute a claim for the purposes of coverage. 
In summary, in order to determine whether an administrative 
filing constitutes a claim, the employee's attorney must examine the 
policy for relevant definitions, and then must examine state law to 
determine whether the state agency has true coercive powers. An 
EEOC charge, under established case law, does not constitute the 
making of a claim. An insured should be aware, however, that re­
course to the courts almost always amounts to a claim for purposes 
of insurance coverage. 
It FAILURE TO GIVE PROMPT NOTICE 
An insured's failure to give prompt notice of a "claim" consti­
tutes a breach of contract and may result in forfeiture of coverage. 
However, in many jurisdictions coverage is not forfeited unless the 
insured's failure to give timely notice results in significant prejudice 
to the insurer, thereby easing the burden on the insured considera­
bly. The problem of late notice is particularly complex in the em­
ployment litigation setting. 
If a terminated employee files a charge with a state agency that 
has coercive authority, and the insured fails to give notice until a 
year or two later after the resolution of the administrative proceed­
ing and the filing of a lawsuit by the same employee, the insurer 
would undoubtedly argue that coverage should be denied, based 
upon late notice and resulting prejudice. However, under the no­
tice-prejudice rule adopted in many states, the prejudice threshold 
is quite high. Generally, an insurer is not able to deny coverage 
absent a showing that the claim no longer is defensible as a result of 
12. § 297.4(c)(iii). 
13. § 297.4(c)(v). 
14. See, e.g., Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954). 
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the untimely notice by the insured.15 
A very different scenario arises under the more narrow "claims 
made and reported" insurance policy. Under the terms of this type 
of policy, the claim not only must be made during the policy period, 
it also must be reported during the same policy period. Due to this 
more explicit language regarding the reporting obligation, the re­
porting aspect of the "claims made and reported" policy is generally 
considered to be a condition precedent to coverage and is enforcea­
ble irrespective of any prejudice to the insurer. Thus, it is impera­
tive that an insured carefully consider the question of what 
constitutes a claim and, where appropriate, give prompt notice of 
that claim to its insurer. For example, in Bums v. International In
surance Co., 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the reporting requirement in a "claims made and 
reported policy" was a condition precedent to the insured's right to 
coverageP Therefore, the notice-prejudice rule did not apply.18 
The courts in California19 and other jurisdictions20 have followed, 
finding that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to claims made 
and reported policies. 
The result of this kind of interpretation can be harsh. For ex­
ample, in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Bauman?1 the court 
held that a claim made during one policy period, but not reported 
15. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King County, 749 F. Supp. 230 (W.O. 
Wash. 1990). See also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a) 
(1988). 
16. 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991). 
17. Id. at 1423. 
18. Id. at 1425. See also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (Rausch), 
270 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Q. App. 1990). 
19. Slater v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Q. App. 1991) (a 
claim filed during the policy period, but not served on the insured nor reported to the 
insurer until after expiration of the policy, was not covered under a claims made and 
reported policy); Merrill & Seeley, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 275 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990) (a claims-made policy's requirement that the insured's negligent act, the 
claim, and the reporting of the claim to the insurer all occur during the policy period did 
not violate public policy); Industrial Indem. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990) (trial court improperly required a claims made liability insurer to prove 
it was prejudiced by the insured's failure to report a claim within the policy's one-year 
extended reporting period). 
20. Esmailzadeh v. Johnson & Speakman, 869 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1989); National 
Union FIre Ins. Co. v. Bauman, No. 90 C 0340, 1992 WL 1738 (N.D. III. Jan. 2, 1992), 
affd, 997 F.2d 305 (1993); Jefferson Guar. Bank v. Westbank-Marrero Cab Co., 570 So. 
2d 498 (La. Q. App. 1990); Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. FIreman's Fund Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 
862,551 N.E.2d 28 (1990); Continental Casualty Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 
Q. App. 1990); Safeco ntle Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 774 P.2d 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
21. Bauman, 1992 WL 1738. 
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until the renewal policy's period, did not comply with either policy's 
"claims made and reported" requirement. In Bauman, the court 
specifically noted that the reporting requirement relates to a single 
policy period, and an insured cannot utilize the renewal period to 
satisfy the reporting requirement for claims first made during the 
initial policy period. 
In addition to the provision that makes it a condition precedent 
to coverage that a claim be first made and reported during the pol­
icy period, many policies' notice provisions place a duty on the in­
sured to provide notice of the claim to the insurer "as soon as 
practicable during the policy period." This places an additional ob­
ligation on the insured to provide timely notice of a claim. To illus­
trate the distinctive obligation of the notice provision, consider a 
claim against an insured that is made on the first day of the policy 
period. If the insured reports the claim on the last day of the policy 
period (just short of a year later), the policy's reporting require­
ment will be satisfied. There could be a question of late notice, 
however, because the insured arguably failed to provide notice of 
the claim "as soon as practicable." Under this example, although 
the reporting requirement was satisfied, coverage may not be avail­
able based upon untimely notice, particularly if the jurisdiction is 
one following the notice-prejudice rule. When evaluating whether 
the reporting provisions of a "claims made and reported" policy has 
been satisfied, it is important to note any policy terms that specify 
the requirements for reporting claims. For example, the policy may 
provide that a claim is deemed reported when mailed to the insurer. 
Of course, a prudent insured may want to err on the side of 
caution and report to its insurer any' employment situation that 
might ultimately result in a claim. The insured has little to lose and 
much to gain by adopting this strategy. If a particular fact or cir­
cumstance is not reported, and it ultimately turns out that it is 
deemed to be a "claim," the insurer might be within its rights to 
deny coverage, assuming that the reporting period has expired. 
Furthermore, notice of facts or circumstances that the insurer 
does not consider to be a claim may be accepted as notice of facts 
or circumstances "likely to give rise to a claim." Most "claims 
made" policies contain language that will relate a claim back to the 
time at which notice of its facts or circumstances was provided. The 
insurers avoid an avalanche of potential notices under these provi­
sions by requiring "full particulars" with respect to names of wit­
nesses, potential allegations and parties involved. If there is 
insufficient information provided, the insurer may reject the notice 
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of potential claim as insufficient, which will mean simply that any 
claim ultimately arising will not relate back. Actual claims arising 
from such inadequately described facts or circumstances may still 
be covered if they are made within the same policy period or they 
may be covered under a subsequent period. 
III. HANDLING THE EMPLOYEE PROBLEM: AVOIDING 

PREJUDICE TO THE INSURER 

It has become somewhat routine for employees, soon-to-be­
terminated employees, and former employees to seek out settle­
ments at the time of their discharge from employment. This can 
arise under different circumstances, but the common theme is that 
the employee demands, either orally or in writing, that he or she 
receive additional compensation above that for which the employ­
ment contract or the severance plan provides. The insured em­
ployer is faced with the dilemma of whether to give notice of each 
and every instance in which a terminated (or about-to-be-termi­
nate d) employee seeks this additional compensation. 
From one standpoint, the foregoing situation may present an 
early and relatively inexpensive opportunity for the employer to 
avert a larger liability problem in subsequent litigation. Thus, the 
employer may regard the settlement demand as the assertion of a 
claim against it. Consequently, the employer may seek to resolve 
the dispute before it escalates into litigation. On the other hand, 
the employer likely will be loathe to settle such "disputes," for fear 
that all departing employees will seek such extraordinary compen­
sation. From this perspective, the employee's demands do not 
amount to a true claim as much as an effort to negotiate additional 
benefits at termination. 
. Depending upon the wording of the policy at issue, an oral de­
mand for severance pay mayor may not constitute a "claim." If the 
circumstances do not constitute a "claim," then the employer 
should be free to try to compromise the demand. An issue arises, 
however, if the employer attempts to settle an employee demand 
without providing notice to the relevant insurers. If such efforts are 
unsuccessful, resulting in litigation with a demand for damages sig­
nificantly greater than the original demand, the insurer may balk at 
providing coverage. Therefore, it is in the insured employers' best 
interest to promptly give notice of facts and circumstances-as well 
as full-blown claims-as they arise. 
This strategy may pose some practical difficulties, however, for 
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both the insured and the insurer. From the insured's standpoint, 
reporting each and every incident in which an employee seeks addi­
tional compensation could result in an increased premium at re­
newal, based upon the number of reported incidents. An increased 
premium might result even if the incidents ultimately are resolved 
for nominal amounts of money. From the insurer's standpoint, the 
reporting of an incident necessitates the opening of a file and claim­
handling expenses on a matter that may never implicate the policy. 
For these and other reasons, there is no perfect strategy for 
reporting potential employment litigation, although the insured 
clearly has an interest in acting in a manner that avoids forfeiture of 
coverage. Any demand for compensation or severance pay from a 
terminated employee could well escalate into a "claim" or litiga­
tion. Failure to give prompt notice of these occurrences or inci­
dents could cause some prejudice to the insurer in the event that 
the insured's handling of the matter prior to notice to the insurer is 
unsuccessful. 
The case law is rather clear that an insured who settles a claim 
without the insurer's written consent, where such written consent is 
required under the policy, will defeat coverage altogether.22 In ad­
dition, the insurer may raise the issue of prejudice and late notice, 
as described above. The insurer also may take the position that the 
insured's handling of the incident rendered litigation more likely 
and more serious, resulting in increased exposure to the insurer. As 
a general rule, insurers will not complain if these types of incidents 
are resolved by the insureds without notice to the insurer. The mo­
ment that an unreported incident results in a claim or litigation, 
however, the insurer may raise a policy defense that would not have 
otherwise been available otherwise and that arises solely from the 
conduct of the insured. 
An example of these complexities is provided by Edinburg 
Consolidated, l.S.D. v. INA a/Ida Pacific Employers Insurance CO.23 
In Edinburg, a teacher requested a review before the state's educa­
tion agency, challenging his termination by the school district for 
which he previously worked. The district was empowered to award 
damages, back pay, reinstatement, and costs. 
The review took place prior to the policy period of the school 
22. Central Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Beck v. American Casualty Co., No. MO-88-CA-303, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13756 
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 1990). 
23. 806 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. a. App. 1991). 
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district's E&O insurance policy. The school district did not give no­
tice of the teacher's grievances until a suit was subsequently filed in 
federal court. The suit plainly was premised on the same facts and 
circumstances that gave rise to the grievance. The insurer in 
Edinburg took the position that, although the suit was filed during 
the policy period, the claim was not covered by the policies because 
the insured had notice of it prior to the policy period and alterna­
tively because the administrative hearing was a claim outside the 
policy period. The court found for the insurer, holding that any 
reasonable interpretation of the term "claim" encompassed the ad­
ministrative proceeding at issue, especially in light of the fact that 
back-pay and damages were sought. 
Similarly, in Marion v. National Casualty CO.,24 a federal action 
was filed by Marion, Illinois police officers alleging improper em­
ployment practices by the city. The city sought coverage under a 
"claims made and reported" E&O policy. Although the federal ac­
tion was filed within the policy period, administrative disciplinary 
proceedings had been going on for years prior to the actuallitiga­
tion, and most of the administrative proceedings took place outside 
the policy period. 
The officers had made repeated threats to file suit during the 
course of the administrative proceedings, but settlement negotia­
tions continually convinced the officers to refrain. It was not until 
the dispute reached its final administrative appeal that litigation 
was commenced. The insurer refused coverage on the grounds that 
the claim made at the time the administrative proceedings were be­
ing conducted was made outside the policy period. 
Although the trial court found for the city, the Iowa Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the term "claim" connotes the asser­
tion of a legal right, rather than the recognition of that right. The 
Iowa Supreme Court felt that the multiple demands, threats of liti­
gation, and continuing settlement negotiations during the adminis­
trative proceedings were clear evidence a claim had been made, 
notwithstanding the officers' failure to actually file litigation. 
Consequently, employers must be aware of the insurance cov­
erage implications of dealing with·employee grievances in the early 
stages. The costs of an aggressive reporting strategy include admin­
istrative efforts and probably higher premiums, but the cost of lax 
reporting may well be a loss of coverage altogether for the claim in 
question. 
24. 431 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1988). 
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IV. MISREPRESENTATION AT THE TIME OF UNDERWRITING 
The issues of what constitutes a claim and whether the insured 
may seek to compromise an employee grievance in its early stages 
without affecting coverage are relevant also to the application and 
underwriting processes. An employer applying for coverage under 
one of the new employment practices liability policies will be re­
quired to answer a long list of questions concerning EEOC filings, 
state agency filings, and more generally, known employee 
problems. To the extent that other coverage may be implicated by 
employment law claims, however, the applications likely will be 
much less specific regarding facts and circumstances about employ­
ment-related problems that are known by the insured. 
For example, an application for D&O liability coverage may 
not ask about EEOC filings specifically: However, the application 
undoubtedly will ask about the insured's knowledge of facts and 
circumstances which might give rise to a claim. In this regard, one 
court very recently has confirmed that failure to give notice of an­
ticipated employment litigation at the time of application can result 
in loss of coverage.25 
When completing an application or renewal application an in­
sured must carefully consider all events that have transpired that 
may fall into the category of facts or circumstances that "might give 
rise to a claim." If the employer fails to disclose employee griev­
ances that might give rise to a claim for which it will demand cover­
age, many jurisdictions will rescind an insurance policy issued on 
incorrect applications. This rule, often dictated by statute, provides 
that when an insured has made incorrect statements in an insurance 
application, coverage can be barred where the statements are mate­
rial to the risk insured, or where the insurer can show that it would 
not have issued the policy under the same terms had it been in pos­
session of accurate information.26 There is no intent requirement 
under many such statutes; unintentional or unknowing misstate­
ments in an insurance policy application can bar coverage if they 
alter the risk or the likelihood of a demand for coverage.27 
Returning to the example of the recently terminated employee 
who demands payments in addition to those provided by the em­
ployers' severance plan, the employer should be aware that if it fails 
25. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. North Am. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 
CV 94-46-02 LGB (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1994). 
26. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahlen, 999 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1993). 
27. Id. at 1536. 
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to disclose this common employee demand at the time of the appli­
cation, the insurer will have a potential coverage defense if the ap­
plication requested information about such circumstances, and they 
are not disclosed. Although it may not appear important to the em­
ployer at the time, the insurer who has already seen many such in­
formal demands escalate into litigation may be able to prove to a 
court's satisfaction that it would have issued the policy under differ­
ent terms had it been aware of the demand. The employer risks 
little in reporting such demands as a matter of course, and in fact, 
making it a standard practice to do so at the time of renewal appli­
cations would serve to keep the insurer abreast of the frequency of 
such demands and thus facilitate more efficient risk management. 
V. LAUNDRY LIST ISSUES 
Based upon the foregoing, an insured employer might deem it 
wise to provide a "laundry list" of facts and circumstances that may 
give rise to a claim when it is getting off risk at the end of the re­
porting period. The term "laundry list" refers to a submission by an 
insured to its insurer-usually towards the end of the policy pe­
riod-of a list of "circumstances" purporting to be notice of poten­
tial claims under the policy. 
A typical strategy for taking advantage of the policy's notice 
provision, this amounts to an effort by an insured to keep the expir­
ing policy alive. As stated above, the notice provision allows the 
insured to report circumstances that might result in a claim being 
made during the policy period. If the insured provides "notice" 
properly, then any claims subsequently arising from the reported 
circumstances-even if the claims are not first made until after the 
expiration of the policy-will be deemed to have been made during 
the policy period. Thus, the insured is motivated to provide a list of 
any circumstances that could conceivably result in a claim at some 
point in the future. 
The issue then arises: do the "circumstances" described in the 
insured's submission sufficiently provide "particulars" so as to con­
stitute a proper notice of claim under the terms of the policy? Par­
ticularity is required in order to allow the insurer to investigate the 
potential claim. Although research reveals no cases involving em­
ployment-practices allegations specifically, there are many cases in­
volving banking, securities and fiduciary-type claims as potential 
claims. The discussion that follows likely will apply equally to the 
employment-practices field. 
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The insured must take care to provide notice that is specific 
and informative enough to apprise the insurer of the nature and 
potential exposure posed by the facts or circumstances at issue. 
Case law holds that mere recitation of the policy language does not 
constitute adequate notice under a "claims made and reported" 
policy. In FDIC v. Marvin L. Caplan,28 the court noted that the 
insured, in attempting to provide notice of a potential claim against 
directors and officers, 
did no more than recite the language of the policy's notice provi­
sion and identify the FDIC as the source of potential claims .... 
The letter said nothing of the types of practices alleged to consti­
tute "wrongful acts," the agents, officers, or directors alleged to 
be involved in wrongdoing, or the time period during which the 
allegedly wrongful act took place. 
On that basis, the court held that, although notice was timely, it was 
insufficient under a "claims made and reported" policy. The court 
stated: "In a claims made policy ... the exact peril insured against 
is the insured's discovery and notice of claims. Notice to the in­
surer, under such a policy, is not merely a technical defense, ... it 
defines the insurer's obligation, and thus the injured party's rights, 
under the law ...."29 
In United Association Local 38 Pension Trust Fund v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. ,30 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit denied an insured's motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the issue of whether the insured's submission of "every­
day financial data" constituted proper notice of facts or circum­
stances likely to give rise to a claim was a question of fact for a jury. 
The insureds, trustees of an employees' benefit trust, submitted a 
renewal application to the insurer during the policy period together 
with a "5500" form. The 5500 form is a document that benefit plans 
must file with the Department of Labor. After the expiration of the 
policy, the Department of Labor asserted a claim against the in­
sureds. The 5500 form contained information that eventually be­
came the subject of the Department of Labor claim. . 
The insureds sued for coverage under the expired policy for 
expenses arising from the claim, arguing that the 5500 form pro­
vided the insurer with notice of a claim during the policy period. 
The insurer argued that the 5500 form merely contained "everyday 
28. 838 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. La. 1994). 
29. Id. at 1131 (citation omitted). 
30. 790 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion amended, 811 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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financial data" and could not therefore constitute notice under the 
policy. Even though the subject policy did not have the "full partic­
ulars" language contained in many claims made and reported poli­
cies, the court found that the issue was at least deserving of jury 
consideration. 
The cases are qualified to some extent by the holding in Fed­
eral Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Burdette.31 In Burdette, a 
federal district court held that a D&O insurer's failure to object to 
the sufficiency of its insured's notice of facts and circumstances 
"likely to give rise to a claim" waived its right to do so later. The 
insured had sent the D&O carrier two letters describing potential 
claims that it thought might be asserted against the insured's direc­
tors and officers. The D&O insurer acknowledged receipt of the 
letters but did not question or challenge the sufficiency of the detail 
contained therein. 
In a subsequent declaratory judgment action filed by the in­
sured, the D&O insurer argued that the two letters did not comply 
with the policy's notice provision and therefore did not constitute 
proper notice under the policy. The court rejected this argument, 
noting as follows: 
[The D&O carrier] did not in any way question the sufficiency of 
the notice, nor did [it] attempt to obtain any more specific infor­
mation relating to the identification of the officers and directors 
to be sued. If notice provided to an insurer is considered by the 
insurer to be defective, good faith requires the insurer to notify 
the insured of its objections within a reasonable time, and if the 
insurer fails to do so or proceeds to act as though notice was 
satisfactory, it has waived any right to assert notice as a defense 
at a later date.32 
On the substantive issue of whether the claims ultimately as­
serted against the directors and officers were described in the notice 
letters previously forwarded to the D&O carrier, the court noted 
that: 
[n]otification as to one loss or claim does not constitute notifica­
tion as to another ... and it would certainly tum the notice provi­
sion in this policy into a nullity to permit notice as to the action 
of one director on a certain date to constitute notice as to an­
other director's unrelated action on a different date.33 
31. 718 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 654 (citation omitted). 
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Hence, the court held that although the insurer waived its right to 
contest the sufficiency of the notice, the insurer was not required to 
afford coverage with respect to claims that were not described in 
the notice letters provided. 
In the context of employment issues, the "laundry list" might 
indicate simply that several employees were terminated. Those in­
dividuals might conceivably make a claim arising from their em­
ployment against the insured at some future date. The question 
then arises: what sort of notice will be adequate under an insurance 
policy such that coverage will be available under the policy after 
expiration of the reporting period? 
In this regard, the general rule is that the adequacy of notice of 
facts and circumstances prior to policy termination will turn on the 
language of the policy. Some policies require that the insured pro­
vide the identity of the claimant, the nature of the wrongful acts, 
the damages alleged, and the circumstances by which the insured 
became aware of the potential claim. As a general principal, if the 
insured is able to articulate the reasons for expecting a claim and to 
otherwise provide the particulars as required by the policy, it is 
more likely that coverage will be afforded at some future date 
based upon the prior notice of a potential claim. Where the "laun­
dry list" looks more like a prophylactic measure, merely giving the 
names of terminated employees with a suggestion that claims and 
litigation might follow, the likelihood of coverage becomes more 
remote. 
Insureds who fail to provide satisfactory information and detail 
regarding potential claims during the policy period often attempt to 
characterize "notice of potential claim" provisions as ambiguous, 
thereby triggering an interpretation that favors their interest. This 
ambiguity often is difficult to establish given the clear and specific 
language employed by most insurers to set forth notice require­
ments. Courts have consistently rejected, however, insureds' at­
tempts to characterize "notice of potential claims" proviSIons as 
ambiguous.34 
Insureds sometimes take the position that the insurer has not 
been prejudiced by the lack of detail in a laundry list letter. How­
ever, courts consistently hold that an alleged absence of prejudice 
34. See, e.g, American Casualty Co. v. Wilkinson, No. CIY-89-1609-W, 1990 WL 
302175 (W.D. Ok. 1990), affd 958 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1992); American Casualty Co. v. 
FDIC, 944 F. 2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Continental Casualty Co., 796 F. 
Supp. 1344, 1352 (D. Or. 1991). 
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to an insurer based upon insufficient notice is irrelevant in the con­
text of "claims made" policies.35 As the court stated in American 
Casualty Co. v. Wilkinson, "the critical and distinguishing feature of 
a 'claims made' policy is notice in accordance with the terms of the 
policy: absent notice during tI,.e policy period, there is no 
coverage."36 
CONCLUSION 
As has been illustrated, employment-practices claims and their 
surrounding circumstances give rise to many difficult coverage is­
sues under "claims made" policies. The threshold issue, of course, 
is what constitutes a claim. The resolution of this issue often de­
pends on the specific language of the policy at issue and also on the 
jurisdiction within which an employee resides. Some certainty is 
gained where a policy provides a definition of what constitutes a 
claim. If the insured's policy has no such definition, then the in­
sured and the insurer need a clear understanding as to what should 
and should not be reported as a claim. 
In those instances where the policy provides no guidance, the 
common law definition of "claim" may be no more than a demand 
for money or services. A filing with an administrative agency that is 
not empowered to award damages or compel other relief services 
generally is not considered a claim. Many state agencies and the 
EEOC fall into this category. When such an agency resorts to the 
additional power of the courts, however, a claim generally will be 
considered to have been made. Many state agencies can award 
damages and compel relief, and insureds and insurers' should be 
cognizant of the powers of each particular agency. 
Even where no claim has been made, it is prudent to be aware 
of when policies require or allow notice of facts or circumstances 
"likely to give rise to a claim." Most insurance applications and 
some renewal applications will inquire about facts or circumstances 
likely to give rise to a claim as a condition to issuing a policy. A 
failure to address questions fully from an insurer in this regard can 
result in a coverage denial in the future. On the other hand, a pru­
dent policy of providing notice of appropriate facts or circum­
stances to insurers will avoid such unexpected coverage denials and 
may not materially affect pr~miums. Both insurers and insureds 
35. Wilkinson, 1990 WL 302175. 
36. Id. at *5. 
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can benefit from a greater knowledge of what mayor may not con­
stitute a claim under policies in effect between them. 
Insureds and insurers should be aware of their rights and obli­
gations under any insurance policy. Because the law is unsettled 
regarding the extent to which demands for extraordinary severance 
by terminated or soon-to-be-terminated employees might constitute 
a claim and the extent to which negotiations in that regard might 
constitute settlement without an insurer's authority, an insured 
should take care to notice all such incidents for which coverage may 
ultimately be desired. The law is well settled that settlement with­
out authority, where such authority is required under the policy, 
will support a coverage denial. 
Finally, an insured should be aware of the nature of the partic­
ular policy they purchased. "Claims made" and "claims made and 
reported" policies are not the same, and the "claims made and re­
ported" policy provides coverage only for claims both made and 
reported within the same policy period, usually one year. Most 
courts have strictly upheld the claims made and reported provisions 
of these policies. Particular care should therefore be taken by an 
insured to stay current on policy renewals, and especially prompt 
notice should be given to claims made near the end of a policy 
period. 
